Three Questions for Maggie Little - by Christine Snyder

1. During her talk, Maggie Little brought up many great points supporting a more “nuanced” view of abortion, including the moral status of the fetus, motherhood, and responsibility of creation. However, even in addressing responsibility associated with creation, the focus was on the idea of responsibly bringing a human being into the world at the appropriate place and time in one’s life, and not on so much on the responsibility associated with the original sexual act. Little seemed to suggest that consenting to sexual intercourse did not automatically commit a woman to carrying the conceptus to term, meaning that she has not necessarily consented to becoming a mother. While I understand her point of view, it seems to me somewhat irresponsible to suggest that using contraception is the extent of responsibility one takes on when engaging in sexual acts. Therefore, one question that I would have liked to ask Maggie Little is to what extent do the participants of a sexual act, at the time the act takes place, have toward the potential conceptus that may result?

2. Maggie Little also commented on “Partial-Birth” Abortion as a somewhat overblown issue by the media and conservative pro-lifers that is intended primarily to handle cases in which the fetus has severe developmental issues or the mother’s health is at serious risk. I agree with her explanation of the use of “Partial-Birth” Abortions and the misconceptions some may have about their use. However, Little did not touch upon the nature of the method by which this surgical technique is performed and moral issues that surround it. It would be interesting to hear her opinion on the morality associated with this form of abortion.

3. Maggie gave a good deal of attention to the prerogative of the mother to make decisions about providing the resources of her body to a fetus, but did not greatly discuss the role of the father in pregnancy and prerogatives that he may have in decision making as half of the fetus’s DNA is his own. Although Little specified that this view of decision making in abortion seems harsh, and even provided further explanation, it would be interesting to hear her thoughts on the rights and roles of the male parent.

Thomson and Abortion - by Stan Kokoszka

Thomson’s analogy between the leeching violinist and the fetus is incorrect because the violinist brings with his actions, intent, whereas the fetus is incapable of such things. On the surface Thomson’s example appears to be a good one, in that, for the woman, she becomes a host to an unwanted parasite. Thomson argues that it would not be unjust to remove the parasites from the woman’s body, because they were placed there without her consent. And it is with this notion of ‘consent’ that a counter argument can be formed.

Despite conceding that it is morally ok for the woman to unhook the violinist if she chooses one shouldn’t concede to the woman removing an unwanted fetus based on Thomson’s terms. Firstly, the violinist wronged the woman when he attached himself to her without first gaining her consent. He placed her in an uncomfortable situation forcing her to make a decision that would immediately affect the violinist’s life. As Alward points out there is a difference between letting one die and killing another person. The woman may have been more liable to refuse the violinist had he or she asked before leeching on. Regardless, there is a difference between this situation and one where birth control fails and a woman becomes pregnant. While it may be true that the fetus is unwanted, it was not the fetus that is responsible for its formation.

Now this is where consent really comes into play. If it is true that the woman consented to sex then aborting the fetus is wrong. This argument sounds so outdated in today’s society, however it remains a strong one. Sex’s purpose, biologically speaking, is procreation. Keeping that in mind, anyone who consents to sex must realize that pregnancy is a common result. Blaming birth control is out of the question because, no form of birth control, save for major surgery, is 100% preventative. (And there have even been rare cases where reproductive surgeries have failed to prevent pregnancy.) Therefore, despite the use of some form of birth control it must be understood that sex could result in a fetus. At what point of all this does the fetus unjustly take liberties from the mother? The answer is nowhere. The fetus is the byproduct, whereas the violinist an input of sorts.
The case of the violinist would be comparable to the fetus if the following were Thomson’s example. Suppose there is some kind of sick and sadistic game show where contestants are asked to pick a door to win a huge cash prize. However, behind one of the doors is a violinist who requires a host for life support. If she chooses this particular door she will have to allow this violinist to leech off of her for a period of time. Now, she doesn’t want this to happen, but because she doesn’t know what is behind what door she must take a chance. Therefore, by playing the game she has consented to the possibility of getting the violinist. Likewise, the woman who has sex, even on birth control, has consented to pregnancy due to the nature of sex. With the analogies equivalent, it is going to be a lot harder for Thomson to make her injustice claims.

A Situation Analogous with Environmental Racism - by Beth Blair

In her article “Bioethics: The Need for a Dialogue with African Americans,” Annette Dula looks at the need to incorporate the perspectives of every sector of society into the field of bioethics and healthcare. She focuses primarily on the historical experiences of African Americans, but acknowledges the fact that the resulting institutional racism can be extended to other racial and ethnic groups. I found her discussion concerning institutional racism to be very interesting, particularly in light of my knowledge about environmental racism. Institutional racism is apparent in the disparities between the healthcare experiences of most blacks as compared to the white population, as well as the differences in the prevalence of diseases. What I liked about Dula’s argument was that she acknowledged that this problem has less to do with race, per se, than it does with poverty. A disproportionate number of poor people are black, which results in lower-paying jobs with fewer benefits, often substandard housing, and limited access to healthcare as a result of issues with things like childcare or transportation. These problems are problems of poverty, not of race. Like institutional racism, environmental racism is less about race than it is about poverty. Because property values decrease dramatically when a potentially hazardous industrial plant is opened in the vicinity, it is logical that those who can afford to will move away, while those with a lower income will move in. Racism results because those in poverty disproportionately belong to minority groups. It seems that, in both environmental racism and the institutional racism in the healthcare system, the real problem is not race discrimination; rather it is the disparity between rich and poor. Perhaps the only real way to effectively tackle racism in society is to find an economic system that more equally distributes wealth among the members of society.

Experimenting on Prisoners - Joshua Pregnar

This summer while an extern with a cardiovascular surgeon in the Scranton area I heard him make a few convincing arguments as to why prisoners, specifically those with life sentences, should be used to help advance modern medicine. I found it interesting that as he made his case no one in the operating room, an additional 5 or 6 people, voiced any objection. It seemed as if these people who had dedicated their life to saving peoples lives, they were all helping perform open heart surgery, felt no moral obligation to those on the fringes of society. However, it is possible that no one voiced an opposing opinion so as not to disrupt the surgeon or create unnecessary tension in their work place.

His argument approximately followed these lines. Since these people had committed a heinous crime they were now indebted to society as a whole. What better way to pay off this debt than to become the guinea pig for an experimental procedure? If everything went well and they survived that was great. If the procedure had not yet been perfected and they died it was no loss to society, they were sentenced to death anyhow. To justify this person's death he stated that valuable information about how to properly perform the procedure would undoubtedly be gained. After a number of such procedures, in his case revolutionary heart operations, the procedure would be perfected. The sacrifice of a few prisoners would to the healing of countless patients throughout the world. In this way death row inmates could pay their debt to society.

He also argued that such a practice would not only advance medicine but also benefit society in a number of other ways. It would help cure prison overcrowding issues. Additionally, keeping the prisoner alive was a financial burden on society, as was the cost of a lethal injection. This money could then be put to a better use. He also felt if prison was less of a day spa there would be fewer criminals.

This summer I did not voice an objection to his claims for a number of reasons. One, he was my boss and signed my pay checks. Secondly, I was still spellbound by what I was seeing everyday and did not want to get two involved in such a deep conversation, afraid that I would miss something spectacular. Most importantly though I did not have a position on this topic let alone the facts necessary to back it up. However, if I were to engage in such a conversation with him today I would confront him about his willingness to take away a prisoners autonymy, even if society stood to gain so much from it.